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The Motives for Athens' Alliance 
with Corcyra (Thuc. 1.44) 
Philip A. Stadter 
D ESPlTE ABLE STUDIES of the Epidamnian affair, and in particu-lar of the Corcyraean and Corinthian speeches at Athens re-
ported in Thucydides 1.32-43,1 the rationale of the Athenian 
decision to enter a defensive alliance with Corcyra has been misun-
derstood. This decision, described by Thucydides in 1.44, is more 
pragmatic, indeed Machiavellian, than regularly supposed. 
The speakers of the two embassies to Athens had attempted to 
play on Athenian fears and ambitions. Corcyra, under the veil of a 
call for justice, had boldly argued the military advantage of an alli-
ance. Their stated premise was that a war would soon break out be-
tween the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. Athenian support for 
Corcyra would be a necessary preparation for the war, for three 
reasons: 
(1) It would create a Corcyraean obligation toward Athens, such 
that the Corcyraean navy would always be at their service, es-
pecially in the coming war (33.2-3); 
(2) it would preserve Corcyra as an independent way-station on the 
route to Sicily, both to block Peloponnesian ships and to support 
those of Athens (36.2); 
(3) above all, it would prevent Corinth's conquest and control of 
the Corcyraean navy, the second largest in the Greek world, by 
which Corinth would possess combined forces larger than the Athe-
nian navy (36.3). 
The Corcyraeans firmly dismissed Athenian fears that such aid might 
break their thirty-year treaty with the Peloponnesians, since in their 
mind, the treaty was guaranteed only by Athenian strength (36.1). 
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The Corinthians, on the other hand, denied the premise that war 
was inevitable, replacing it with their own assertion that an Athenian 
alliance with Corcyra would rupture the treaty with the Pelopon-
nesians (40.2-3). Like the Corcyraeans, they argued from advantage, 
but stressed the present and past, not the future: 
(1) It was to Athens' advantage to respect Corinth's right to punish 
its subject ally, Corcyra, as Corinth had respected Athens' right to 
punish Samos when it revolted (40.4-6); 
(2) Athens owed a debt to Corinth for her support in earlier years 
(41.1-3); 
(3) there was no war in sight, but an Athenian alliance with Cor-
cyra would start one (42.2). 
The first point might be called an ancient example of the Brezhnev 
doctrine applied in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, that each hege-
monic state has the right to control its subject states without interfer-
ence from other powers. The Corinthians' argument carries a threat 
to interfere in Athens' relations with her subjects, if Athens inter-
feres in Corcyra. 
Both speeches relied upon similar unspoken assumptions of equality 
with Athens: Corcyra, trusting in its imposing navy, proposed an alli-
ance on equal terms for mutual benefit, and implied that Athens would 
need its support on this occasion. Corinth, on the other hand, pre-
sented itself as a hegemonic state similar to Athens, and urged mutual 
respect of each other's role. The Athenians could accept individual 
points made by each side, but not this underlying premise of equality. 
Stahl's analysis of the stages of escalation in the Epidamnian affair, 
from one level of power to another, demonstrates that Thucydides 
had a clear vision of a power hierarchy.2 The quarrel began on a local 
level, the stasis between two factions at Epidamnus. It moved to a 
second level when two large cities, Corcyra and Corinth, took sides. 
But a quite different level of power was reached when Athens, a 
major hegemonic power-what we might call a super-power-became 
involved, thus provoking a clash of the two super-powers, Athens 
and Sparta. The Athenian decision about Corcyra demonstrates that 
they shared Thucydides' recognition of their superiority to all Greek 
states except Sparta, and rejected the assumption of equality implicit 
in the arguments of both Corcyra and Corinth. 
On the first day of Athenian debate, Thucydides tells us (44.1), the 
Athenians gave as much weight to the Corinthian arguments as to 
the Corcyraean-that is, we may assume, they were not able to re-
2 See Stahl (supra n.l) 36. 
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solve the dilemma between losing the Corcyraean navy to Corinth 
and rupturing the treaty with Sparta. But on the second day a new 
solution was found: a defensive alliance, by which Athens would 
agree to defend Corcyra's shores, but not to attack Corinth. It is 
wrong to think that Athens by this decision accepted the Corcyraean 
position and rejected the Corinthian. Rather they attempted to go 
between the horns of the dilemma, satisfying neither party com-
pletely. Corcyra, after all, had wanted active Athenian support in 
fighting the Corinthians as common enemies (35.5); Corinth a com-
plete hands-off policy while she humbled her recalcitrant colony. 
Athens looked out for herself. 
According to Thucydides3 five factors influenced Athens' decision: 
(1) she did not want to break the treaty,4 (2) war with the Pelopon-
nesians was coming, (3) she did not want the Corcyraean navy to fall 
under Corinthian control, (4) she wanted Corinth and Corcyra to 
clash as much as possible, (5) Corcyra seemed a good way-station on 
the route to Italy and Sicily. 
Athens' desire not to break the treaty is confirmed in the narrative 
that follows. The Athenian forces make every effort to avoid a direct 
confrontation, and even after they engage the Corinthians at Sybota, 
the Athenians refuse to admit that the treaty has been broken. Nev-
ertheless, they expected war to break out even if they did not break 
the treaty.5 Therefore the Athenians did not prefer to honor the 
treaty to prevent war from ever breaking out, but for other reasons 
not stated, such as to honor a sworn commitment, to avoid the op-
probrium of being an aggressor, or to prepare better for the coming 
conflict. Thucydides does not state their reasons for agreeing with 
Corcyra on the inevitability of the war. Besides the Spartan fear and 
Corinthian hostility noted by the Corcyraeans (35.3), they may have 
thought of other sore points in their relations with the Peloponnesian 
league, such as Megara and Aegina. 
3 i&)KEL yap 0 7Tpoe; ilEA07TOVV1]Utove; 7TOAEJLOe; Kat We; €UEu(}m aVToLe;, Kat ~V Kep-
KVpav e!30vAovTo /-LT, 7TpO€u(JaL TOLe; Koptv(JioLe; VaVTtKOV ;xovuav TOuOVrov, ~y­
KPOVELV 8e OTt ,.wALUTa aVTove; aAA'1]AOLe;, iva au(}uEuTepoLe; OVUtv, ill' Tt 8ey/, Koptv-
()ioL'i TE Kat TOLe; aAAoLe; VaVTtKOV EXOVULV ee; 7TOAE/-WV Ka()WTC'iWTaL. a/-LU 8€ rile; TE 
'ITahLae; KU" LLKEhLae; Kahwe; EcjxtivETO aVTo'i:e; r, vT/uoe; EV 7Tapa7Th~ Ketu(Jm. 
4 This factor is implicit in l.44.1, Ei yap . .. , iAVOVT' til' aVToLe; ai 7Tpoe; ilEA07TOV-
v1]uiovc; U7TO v8ai. 
5 The precise interpretation of Kat We; €UEu()m is difficult: We; should refer to the 
immediately preceding condition, and therefore mean "even if they concluded only a 
defensive alliance." However, the implied sense seems more inclusive, "even if they 
did not break the treaty," expressing the sentiment behind the rejection of the alliance. 
Thucydides does not make explicit the effect of taking no action, but seems to imply 
that it would have been the same as that of making the defensive alliance. 
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However, there would have been no need for any Athenian action 
unless factors (3) and (5) were applicable as well. These points were 
made by the Corcyraeans, but no doubt had already been considered 
at Athens. It was essential that Corcyra's fleet not be made subject to 
Corinth. Athens' position as a super-power on a par with Sparta de-
pended upon the superior size and expertise of her fleet. The transfer 
of Corcyra into the Peloponnesian sphere of influence would nullify 
that strength. Athens would no longer be Sparta's equal, not because 
its power had diminished, but because Sparta's had grown. 
But they did not believe Corcyra's argument that an alliance be-
tween them would create a lasting debt of gratitude. They doubtless 
agreed with the Corinthians that the Corcyraeans were not to be 
trusted (37.2-3). An independent Corcyra, with a fleet of 120 ships, 
puffed up by a victory over Corinth, and strengthened further by 
captured Corinthian ships, might interfere with Athenian plans, or 
even turn against her. The history of the Delian league demonstrates 
that Athens in the mid-fifth century was not seeking independent 
allies among the Greeks, but subject states who would recognize her 
hegemony. We do not find Thucydides giving as a reason for the 
Athenian decision a desire to see a free and independent Corcyra. 
The ideal Athenian policy was different, and had been enunciated by 
the Corcyraeans themselves: "If you are able, it would be best to 
permit no one else to possess a navy, but if you cannot do that, you 
should have as a friend whoever is most reliable."6 The fourth Ath-
enian reason for their decision is a restatement of that ideal principle: 
"They wanted them to clash with each other as much as possible, so 
that when they went to war, the Corinthians and the others who 
possessed a navy would be weaker." The 'others' would include not 
only the allies of Corinth (c! 1.27.1) but Corcyra herself. In their 
conflict with each other, Corcyra and Corinth would weaken their 
navies until they posed no threat to Athenian supremacy on the sea. 
The defensive alliance with Corcyra was for this purpose the ideal 
compromise. Athens, without breaking the treaty, could support Cor-
cyra just enough for her to be able to resist Corinth, but not enough 
to win decisively or to become a threat to Athens. When the inevi-
table war came, Corinth-and all other naval powers-would be too 
weak to affect materially the course of the war. 
The logic of this decision explains the small number of ships sent 
with Lakedaimonios to Corcyra. It was not to Athens' advantage for 
6 Thuc. 1.35.5: ... ~AcnTa J-tEl', Ei 8vl'au(JE, f.L'T/8el'a aAAol' Eell' KEKrTju(Jm l'aVe;, Ei 
BE f.LTJ, OUTt'> EXVPWTa'To,>, 'ToVrol' cfJ:Aol' EXELl'. 
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Corinth to be so frightened by a large Athenian force (say, of fifty 
ships) as not to dare to engage. Moreover, a dramatic Corcyraean 
victory over Corinth, won with the help of a strong Athenian squad-
ron, would have given Corcyra naval superiority in West Greek 
waters, and tempted her toward hegemony over states in the area. 
Lakedaimonios' command of ten ships was not an attempt by Pericles 
to discredit him, as Plutarch thinks,7 but a carefully calculated force, 
designed to encourage the Corcyraeans to fight, but not to save them 
from disaster. The actual effect of the battle of Sybota-apart from 
the unexpected engagement of the Athenians and Corinthians-was 
that which the Athenians desired: the Corcyraean fleet suffered a loss 
of seventy ships, and was reduced from 120 to 50 units. The Corin-
thians and their allies lost thirty of a total of 150 (54.2). No doubt the 
Athenians would have preferred the Corinthians to lose more ships 
and the Corcyraeans fewer (worries about their calculations had led 
them to send the relief force of twenty ships), but their object had 
been accomplished. Both sides were weakened. In particular, Corcyra 
no longer figured as a major naval power, belying the arguments of 
the Corcyraean speech. Although in 431 they supported the Athenian 
fleet circling the Peloponnese with fifty ships, the only other Cor-
cyraean force supporting Athenian operations whose strength is listed 
by Thucydides is the squadron of fifteen ships in 426 (3.94.1). Cor-
inth for its part had to abandon its claim to a hegemonic role and 
turn to Sparta for support. 
Finally, we note that the defensive alliance protecting Corcyra was 
all that Athens needed to maintain a friendly base on the route to 
Italy and Sicily. Despite its weakened navy, Corcyra was able to fulfill 
this role in 425 and 415-413. An independent and powerful Corcyra 
might have hindered Athenian movements or attempted to use them 
for its own purpose. 
The war did come, but Athens by its decision had effectively safe-
guarded the superiority of its navy, and its role as a super-power. 
Realpolitik had achieved its goals-or at least some of them. One may 
wonder, however, what influence this calculatedly lukewarm support 
had on future developments in Corcyra. To the men captured at Sy-
bota and held so long in Corinth, Athens may have seemed a dan-
gerous ally, and Corinth despite its hostility more reliable or at least 
7 Per. 29.2. Plutarch ascribes the decision to aid Corcyra to Pericles, reasonably 
enough. However, it is doubtful that he had any precise information to that effect; he 
regularly ascribes to the hero of a life decisions which in his source are attributed to 
'the Athenians' or other general groups of which the hero was a part: contrast, e.g., 
Nie. 10.2 and Thuc. 5.22.1-2. 
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predictable. Athenian cynicism may have been one of the causes of 
the stasis which would ravage the city and threaten to bring it over to 
the Peloponnesians. Machiavellian politics sometimes carries hidden 
costs. 
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